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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LEAH M. DALY, Executrix for
the Estate of Eva Dean Daly,
deceased,

/
/

Plaintiff and
Respondent/
:

/

'

vs,

•

Case No.

GEORGE F. DALY/
Defendant and
Appellant.

/

13517

/

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The Appellant/ George F. Daly, appeals from
the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce granted to
the Respondents predecessor, Eva Dean Daly/
deceased/ on the 10th day of August/ 1973/ in
the District Court for the Third Judicial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

District in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge,
presiding, together with the District Court's
Orders of October 11, 1973, denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion to Modify
Decree, and granting Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend Decree, along with the District Court's
Order of October 26, 1973, declaring the
Respondent-Executrix, Leah M. Daly, to be the
owner in fee simple of designated real property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The above matter came on regularly for a nonjury trial on the 18th day of July, 1973, before
the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding.

On the 10th

day of August, 1973, the District Court entered
its Interlocutory Decree of Divorce pursuant
to its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, ordering, inter alia,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the Plaintiff be awarded a Decree of
Divorce from the Defendant, said Decree not
becoming final and absolute until the expiration
of three months from the date and entry of
said Decree? and further, awarding to the
Plaintiff the real property of the parties
located at 1806 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, subject to an equitable lien in favor of
the Defendant in the amount of $8,000.00,
together with, the ordinary life insurance policy
on the life of the Defendant.
On October 11, 1973, subsequent to the death
of the Plaintiff, occurring September 23, 1973,
the District Court denied the Defendant's
Motions to Dismiss said action and Motion to
Modify Decree so as to award to the Defendant
the herein described real property and ordinary
life insurance policy.

On the 26th day of

October, 1973, the District Court granted an
Order determining the Respondent's Executrix,
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Leah M. Daly, to be the owner in fee simple in
said described real property and substituted
said Executrix as party-plaintiff herein.

The

Defendant in the Lower Court is hereinafter
referred to as Appellant and the substituted
Plaintiff in the Lower Court is hereinafter
referred to as Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Interlocutory
Decree of Divorce granted in the District Court
insofar as it awards the real property situated
at 1806 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and the ordinary life insurance policy to the
Respondent, together with reversal of the
District Court's Order denying Appellant's
Motion to Dismiss and Appellant's Motion to
Modify Decree, and said District Court's Order
determining the Executrix, Leah M. Daly, to be
the fee simple owner of said property, and
remanding same to the District Court with
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proper instructions to modify said Decree so
as to award to the Appellant said real property
and ordinary life insurance policy; or in the
alternative, dismissing said matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
George F. Daly, now 67 years of age, and
Eva Dean Daly, deceased, were married the 29th
day of December, 1928, at Salt Lake City, Utah.
During the course of said marriage, three
children were born to the parties, all of whom
have attained their majority and are not dependent on either party for support. CR-3) Mrs. Dal
worked throughout the marriage and Mr. Daly was
regularly employed to the time he was retired
on disability from the State of Utah. CR-6* 7
& 81

Subsequent to his retirement, Mr. Daly

received and continues to receive the monthly
sums of $227.00 from Social Security and $77.50
from State Retirement as his sole income. (R-12)
Prior to their separation, the parties
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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resided together in their home located at 1806
Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Said

home represented the most substantial asset
acquired by the parties during their marriage,
and for the purchase of which they both, togethe
with contributions from their daughter, Leah M.
Daly, devoted their respective earnings. (R-27,5
60,64 & 67)

Leah M. Daly, Executrix herein,

currently 43 years of age, resided with her
parents throughout the marriage and made
contribution to the family during said time.
CR-6I

Said home was purchased by the parties

in joint tenancy in 1952 for a purchase price
of $18,500.00. (R-5) A downpayment of approximately $5,000.00 was made from the equity
remaining upon the sale of the prior home of
the parties. CR-5 & 24)

The payments upon the

home were substantially completed at the time
of the trial of the above matter.
Mr. Daly was retired from the State of Utah
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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owing to back difficulties (R-30) and at the
time of the trial herein suffered from diabetes,
a heart condition, and prostate ailments. (R21 & 22)

Owing to his condition of health,

Mr. Daly is physically unable to undertake
employment for his support.
On September 23, 1973, 43 days following
the making and entry of the Interlocutory Decree
of Divorce herein and within the three-month
interlocutory period, Mrs. Daly died of natural
causes.

Upon this change of circumstances, on

the 27th day of September, 1973, Mr. Daly duly
moved the District Court to dismiss the divorce
action filed herein, or in the alternative,
to modify the Decree so as to award to him the
real property of the parties herein mentioned
and said ordinary life insurance policy.

On

October 11, 1973, the District Court denied
both Motions and on October 26, 1973, entered
its Order allowing the Executrix, Leah M. Daly,
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to be substituted as party-plaintiff herein,
and further determining said Leah M. Daly
to be the owner in fee simple of said real
property•

Appellant-Defendant, George F.

Daly's, Notice of Appeal to this Honorable
Court was filed November 26, 1973.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
AND/OR MODIFY THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE
OF DIVORCE IN LIGHT OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.
The law is clear in the State of Utah, that
following the entry of a divorce decree, the
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to
alter or modify such decree with respect to
the support and maintenance of the parties or
division of property as may be provided therein
as shall to the court be reasonable and necessary.

Utah: Code Annotated (1953) , Section
-8-
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30-3-5 (1973 Supp.), specifically provides:
When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation
to the children, property, and parties,
and the maintenance of the parties
and children, as may be equitable.
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes
or new orders with respect to the
support and maintenance of the parties,
the custody of the children and of
their support and maintenance, or the
distribution of the property as shall
be reasonable and necessary.
Generally, to justify such a modification
with respect to the division of property, a party
must demonstrate a change in circumstances from
those existing at the time the decree was
entered. Cody v. Cody, 47 Ut. 456, 154 P. 952
C1916).

The determination as to what shall

constitute a sufficient change of circumstances,
as well as the original distribution of property
itself, rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, though such may not be
exercised arbitrarily.

Pinney v. Pinney, 66

Ut. 612, 245 P. 329 (1926)• Stewart v. Stewart,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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66 Ut. 366, 242 P. 947 (1926).

Such discretion

has been in fact held to be wider and more
liberal where, as here, a modification is sough
during the interlocutory period.
67 Ut. 316, 247 P. 301 (1926).

Alley v. Alle:

For example,

sufficient changes in circumstances to justify
modifications have been found where a party
experiences a substantial increment in earnings,
Harrison v. Harrison, 22 Ut.2d 180, 450 P.2d
456 QL969L, or a change in the health of a
party, King v. King, 25 Ut.2d 163, 478 P.2d 492
(1970).

With respect to the division of

property, this Honorable Court in Foreman v.
Foreman, 111 Ut. 72, 176 P.2d 144 (1946),
detailed the following elements to be determined
by the trial court:
CD.

The amount and kind of property owned
by each of the parties;
C21 Whether the property was his before
coverture or accumulated jointly;
C3I The ability and opportunity of each .
to earn money;
C41 The financial condition and necessities
of each party;
-10-
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(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

The health of the parties;
The standard of living of the parties;
The duration of the marriage;
What the wife gave up by the marriage;
and
What age they were when married.

In the instant case, it must expressly be
noted that the parties 1 marriage (since 1928)
was of long duration; that the earnings of each
went largely into the purchase of their home
at 1806 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah; that
said home represented the only substantial asset
and savings of the parties; that all children
of the parties are of majority and independent
of the parties; that the Appellant is of
advanced years and in ill health and without
employment or appreciable income; and perhaps
most importantly, that the Plaintiff's spouse
became deceased during the interlocutory period.
Indeed, it would be most difficult to envision
a greater change of circumstances subsequent
to the entry of a divorce decree than the demise
of one of the parties; again bearing in mind
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the absence of any minor children requiring
support.

Under such a factual situation, it

must be respectfully submitted, that the
Honorable Trial Court abused its discretion in
failing to modify the Decree so as to award to
the Appellant the interest of the parties in
the home, whose need of same is no less than
compelling; together with the herein mentioned
ordinary life insurance policy*
Moreover, there is ample authority for the
proposition that the Honorable Trial Court
should well have dismissed the divorce action
and vacated any award of property made pursuant
thereto, where under circumstances as presented
herein, a party becomes deceased during the
interlocutory period.

As stated by this Court

in the case of In Re Johnson's Estate, 84 Ut.
168, 25 P.2d 305 C1934]:
The entry of the decree ... does not
at once terminate the marriage relationship and give to the parties the
status of single persons. That
•12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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relationship is dissolved when the
decree becomes final. Id, at 306.
(Emphasis added) (Citing with approval
Sanders v, Industrial Commission, 64
Ut. 372, 230 P. 1026 (1924); Utah
Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission,
65 Ut. 100, 234 P. 697 (1925); Spencer
v. Clark, 54 Ut. 83, 179 P. 741 (1919);
Salt Lake City v. Indus trial Commi s s ion,
22 P.2d 1046 (Ut. 1933).
This Court, in Johnsonf s Estate, furthered:
Under the doctrine of these cases
and under the plain language of the
statute, [the predecessor to Utah
••' Code Annotated C1953) Sections 30-3-6
& 30-3-7 (1973 Supp.)], the court
had jurisdiction to vacate the interlocutory decree at any time before it became
final and thus prevent the decree from
becoming final. The death of the
defendant before the decree became
final would be sufficient ground for
vacating the decree of divorce, as no
final judgment could be entered against
a deceased person and no one could be
substituted for him in such an action.
Id. at 306 CEmphasis added).
Upon the foregoing authorities, it must be
indisputable that the Appellant became widowed
upon the death of the Respondent's predecessor
in this action; that the divorce never did nor
could become final and effective, being moot
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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upon Mrs. Daly's death as a matter of law;
and that as Decedent's surviving husband and
joint tenant to the property in question,
Appellant became the fee simple owner of same
by operation of law.

Indeed, as stated by the

Court in Johnson's Estate, the district court
was without authority to substitute the Decedent
Executrix as party-plaintiff herein, least yet
declare her to be the owner of said real propert
in fee simple. As specifically held by the
Court in Johnson's Estate:
Since the plaintiff was the wife of
... [the deceased] at the time of
his death, it would naturally follow
that she became vested with every
right which the law grants to the
surviving spouse. Id. at 307 (Emphasis
added).
In the case of In Re Johnson's Estate, supra,
involving a factual situation substantially
similar to the case at bar, where the husband
died during the interlocutory period, the Court
held the surviving wife to have letters of
administration of the deceased's estate issued
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to her as a matter of right.

Similar to the

governing statute in the authorities heretofore
cited, Utah Code Annotated (1953), Sections
30-3-6 SL 30-3-7 (1973 Supp.), provide:
If after the hearing of any action
for divorce the court renders a decree
of divorce for either party, the decree
shall specifically provide, that it
shall not become absolute until the
expiration of three months from the
day it is signed by the court and
entered by the clerk in the register
of actions, or until such other time
as the court may specifically designate,
but not more then six months thereafter.
... the decree of divorce shall become
absolute at the expiration of three
months from the entry thereof? unless
an appeal or other proceedings for
review are pending, or the court,
before the expiration of said period
for sufficient cause, otherwise orders.
The court, upon application or on its
own motion for good cause shown, shall
have the authority to waive, alter,
or extend the period of time before
the decree shall become absolute, but
not to exceed six months from the
signing and entry of the decree.
Pursuant to such authority, the District
Court in the instant case specifically condition
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Decree of Divorce to provide:
That said decree shall not become
final and absolute until the expiration
of three months from the date of entry
of said decree, that upon the expiration of three months from the date
of entry of said decree, the decree
shall become final and absolute, dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing
between the plaintiff and defendant
and restoring them to the status of
single unmarried persons•
In the case of Spencer v. Clark, 54 Ut. 83,
179 P. 741 (1919), an action regarding real
property brought by a surviving husband against
the executor of his wife's estate, where as
here, the latter died prior to the expiration
of an interlocutory decree of divorce, the
Court specifically overturned the trial court's
ruling that the interlocutory decree had become
absolute.

Interestingly, in the divorce action

giving rise to the litigation in Spencer, the
trial court dismissed same after the death of
the plaintiff on motion of the defendant.

This

procedure was similarly followed with approval
in the later case of In Re Johnson's Estate,
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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supra, wherein Spencer was cited with approval.
See In Re Johnson's Estate, 84 Ut. 168, 25 P.2d
305, 306 (1954).
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission,
22 P.2d 1046 (Utah 1933), this Court, in affirming an award of the Industrial Commission to
the widow where, as in the case at bar, the
husband died during an interlocutory period,
similarly noted that the trial court had set
aside and dismissed the divorce action.
Admittedly, in the more recent case of In Re
Harper's Estate, 1 Ut.2d 296, 265 P.2d 1005
C19541, this Court expressly overruled Salt Lake
City v. Industrial Commission, supra, and In
Re Johnson's Estate, supra, ,f[T]o the extent
the decisions in those cases indicate approval
of ex parte Orders as the basis for vacating
divorce decrees affecting property rights...."
Harper's Estate, supra, at 1007. The facts
presented in Harper's Estate are essentially
-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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identical to those herein.

There, the survivir

widow during the interlocutory period obtained
an ex parte dismissal of the divorce action
and brought an action against the administrator
seeking a decree vesting her with title to
property of the parties as the surviving joint
tenant.

This Court, on appeal, reversed the

trial court's order vesting title in the widow,
but remanded same "with directions to dismiss
the petition without prejudice and allow the
parties to be heard upon the merits in the
divorce action should they so desire".

Harper's

Estate at 1007. There, the Court noted without
necessarily so holding stated:
However, the occurrence of death does
not abate the action itself and to
the extent that property rights are
determined by the decree, it remains
effective and becomes final in the
same manner and at the same time as
between living persons.
However, it must be observed that the Court's
prime concern in Harper's Estate and, indeed
-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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its holding^ was simply the voiding of an
ex parte order of dismissal where, unlike the
instant case, an opportunity was not given to
interested parties to be heard in defense of
any rights granted by the interlocutory decree.
See Rasmussen v. Call, 55 Ut. 597, 188 P. 275
(1920), (quoted with approval in Harperf s
Estate!.

In the case at bar, Appellantfs Motion

to Dismiss and his Motion to Modify Decree were
not sought ex parte, but rather all interested
parties through their counsel were given notice
and represented.

In the words of the Court:

This statutory power [of Utah Code
Annotated (1953), Section 30-3-7
(1973 Supp.)] does not allow the court
to vacate a decree without legal cause
nor without giving all persons whose
rights are involved an opportunity to
be heard. In Re Harper*s Estate,
supra, at 1006.
Notwithstanding, the court did specifically
find:
The death of a party before the decree
becomes absolute may under some circumstances be sufficient cause to vacate
-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the decree in its entirety. Other
factors, such as the welfare of minor
children, may in some instances warrant
a different disposition of property.
In each case the court must give each
person whose rights are involved the
opportunity to be heard* Id. at 1007
CEmphasis added}.
Accordingly, Harper's Estate can be cited
only for the proposition that in granting the
dismissal of an interlocutory decree or a
modification thereof, all factors must be
considered and all interested persons given
an opportunity to be heard.

Under the facts

of the instant case, the interests of all were
represented and the equities clearly prepondered
in favor of Appellant.

This being so, the

Honorable Trial Court abused its discretion in
failing to grant to Appellant a dismissal or
a modification of the decree.

In the language

of the statute, the awarding to the Appellant
upon the death of his wife, being not only the
most "equitable" distribution of property, is
indeed and unquestionably both "reasonable and
-20-
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necessary".

Utah Code Annotated (1953), Section

30-3-5 (1973 Supp.).
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, submitted that upon the
basis of the foregoing authorities, the drastic
alteration in the circumstances of the parties
occasioned by the death of Mrs. Daly, and the
compelling equities of the case as evidence by
the necessitious condition of the Appellant,
that the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion in failing to grant Appellant1s Motion
to Dismiss or his Motion to Modify the Decree
so as to award to him the home of the parties,
together with the ordinary life insurance policy,
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID J. KNOWLTON
HORACE J. KNOWLTON
Attorneys for Appellant
-21-
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Two copies of the above and foregoing Brief
of Appellant were posted in the U.S. mail
postage prepaid and addressed to the Attorney
for the Respondent, Grant McFarland, at 725
Union Pacific Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
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